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We present the finite first-order theory (FFOT) machine, which provides an atemporal description of
computation. We then develop a concept of complexity for the FFOT machine, and prove that the
class of problems decidable by a FFOT machine with polynomial resources is NP∩ co-NP.
In the 1960’s Cobham and Edmonds [4, 7] asserted that a computational problem is feasibly computable
if and only if it can be decided in polynomial time on a Turing machine (and thereby lies in P). Though
not within the originally intended scope, it has been suggested [15] that Cobham and Edmonds assertion
should also apply to what is feasibly computable by any physical system 1. However, this idea has
since been challenged by results from quantum computation [13], such as Shor’s factorisation algorithm,
which suggest that the class of problems decidable by a quantum computer in polynomial time (BQP)
may include problems that do not lie in P. These results lead naturally to the questions of what it is about
quantum systems that makes them capable of feasibly deciding problems outside of P, and whether there
exist other physical systems with such capabilities.
In [2] Blakey described a collection of classical physical devices capable of factorising integers in
polynomially bounded space and time. However, Blakey argued that, unlike quantum factorisers, his
factorisation systems are not feasibly realisable, as the precision required to implement such a system
has to grow exponentially with the size of the input. Blakey then went on to assert that in general the
resource usage of physical computational devices should be measured in more than just time and space
alone. For example the energy or precision required by a computation should also be considered.
In [1] Baumeler and Wolf looked into the computational power of polynomially bounded circuits
acting within closed timelike curves of polynomial length. They asserted that a computation may occur
on such a circuit if it is logically consistent and unique, demonstrating that with these assumptions the
computational power of these non-causal circuits is equal toUP∩co-UP 2. Notably, BQP problems such
as the factorisation problem also lie inUP∩ co-UP, suggesting that there may be a non-causal aspect to
the quantum speed-up.
Baumeler and Wolf’s innovative non-causal circuit model did not have the goal of describing the
feasible computational aspects of a general physical system. However, in an attempt to do just that, in
this paper we develop the concept of a finite first-order theory (FFOT) machine, and describe what
it means to compute efficiently with such a device. In [16] we introduced the concept of a theory
machine, which is inspired by Horsman et al.’s reasoning on physical computation [11] and Gurevich’s
sequential abstract-state machines [9]. Rather than describing each computation as a discrete ordered
1By physical system, we mean anything whose physical properties are known that we may realistically put together and
use. Computing with a physical system should then involve being able to input data into the system (by adjusting the locations
or properties of the objects within) so that we may reliably observe an output from the system that provides a solution to some
problem of ours. Examples include a table of ball bearings and grooves, a screen diffracting a ray of light, a slide rule, and
indeed a normal digital computer.
2A problem is in UP if it is decidable by a non-deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time, and there exists at most
one accepting path for each input.
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sequence of structures, in a theory machine the whole computation is described via a single consistent
structure. Hence any temporal evolution of the machine is described within this structure. The inclusion
of the evolution within the structure allows a theory machine to compute in a consistent non-causal or
atemporal manner.
In [16] we demonstrated how various super-Turing systems3 are examples of theory machines. Such
systems include Blum-Shub-Smale machines [3], which perfectly perform algebraic operations in sin-
gle time steps, and infinite time Turing machines [10], whose computations take an infinite amount of
time steps. Whether such powerful systems should be viewed as physical systems is of course highly
questionable, which is why in [16] we also introduced the FFOT machine. FFOT machines are theory
machines that are restricted to finitely describing computational systems using only first-order logic.
In [16] we proved that a word function is computable by a FFOT machine iff it is computable by a Tur-
ing machine. Meaning that the computational aspects of a super-Turing system cannot be described by a
FFOT machine.
InWhen does a physical system compute? [11] Horsman, Stepney, Wagner, and Kendon put forward
a minimal collection of requirements that a physical system must satisfy in order for it to be capable of
computation. Horsman et al. asserted that in order for a person to be able to compute with a physical
system they must be able to abstractly represent the necessary workings of the system, whilst possessing
a sufficiently correct theory of how the system behaves. We assert that this representation and theory
can be expressed in terms of first-order logical sentences. A FFOT machine is then given by a triple
M= (T,I,O)where T is a set of first-order sentences, and I andO are sets of sets of first-order sentences.
The theory of the system is given by T, which describes the necessary aspects of a system that we wish to
compute with. T is also finite in order to conform with Horsman et al.’s assertion that the theory must be
knowable to the user. The set of admissible inputs into the system is given by I, and the set of measurable
outputs from the system is given by O.
The key idea behind a FFOTmachine is that for any Φ∈ Iwe can obtain a structure Pwhich satisfies
T∪Φ. InP there is at most one true output Θ ∈O, we then take Θ to be the outcome of the computation
by M on input Φ. This structure P does not need to contain a clear notion of time, nor does Θ need to
follow from I via a clear sequence of steps. Hence the typical notion of a sequential causal computation
does not necessarily occur within a FFOT machine. However, we shall insist that the only way Θ can
be the output of M on input Φ is if Θ is true in every model T∪Φ, which ensures that the computation
can not just happen in one uncomputable step. Instead, as we shall see, the computation must still have
a non-trivial amount of structure to it in order to produce an output.
The nature of a FFOT machine computation is intended to mimic what happens when we use a
physical system to carry out a decision process. For example, suppose we wish to compute with some
kinematic system of billiard balls, to do this we can use the axioms of Newtonian mechanics as our
theory T to predict the motions of the system (Newtonian mechanics may not be a perfect description of
reality, but in many cases it is more than good enough). Each input Φ ∈ I could be a non-contradictory
description of the positions and velocities of the balls at some initial time t0. Whereas each output Θ∈O
could be a position measurement at some final time t1. As this is a real physical situation we should
always be able to create a kinematic scenario from t0 to t1 in which T∪Φ is satisfied. Though due to
imprecision and the inexactness of the theory T there are likely to be many scenarios that satisfy T∪Φ,
however if we know that in each of them only the output Θ is true, then the exact scenario created does
not matter, all that matters is which element of O is true given an input of Φ.
3By super-Turing we mean a system which is capable of deciding problems that are not decidable by a Turing machine.
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1 FFOT machine computation
Given all of this, below we give the definition of a FFOT machine in a (first-order) vocabulary V. Where
as in [9] a vocabulary consists of a finite set of relations, functions and constant symbols. A V-sentence
is then a first-order formula constructed from the elements of V without any free variables.
Definition 1.1 Let V be a vocabulary, a finite first-order theory (FFOT) machine in the vocabulary of
V is a triple M= (T,I,O) where T, I and O are sets of V-sentences such that:
• T is a finite set of V-sentences,
• I and O are sets of sets of V-sentences,
• For every Φ ∈ I the set T∪Φ is satisfiable,
• For every Φ ∈ I and Θ,Ψ ∈O if Θ 6= Ψ then the set T∪Φ∪Θ∪Ψ is not satisfiable.
We call T the theory ofM, call I the set of inputs of M, and call O the set of outputs from M. We say
that the FFOT machineM computes Θ from Φ if T∪Φ |= Θ.We denote this by:
M(Φ) = Θ.
Let Θ,Ψ ∈O where Θ 6= Ψ, if there exists a model of T∪Φ where Θ is true and another model of T∪Φ
where Ψ is true, then M cannot compute anything on input Φ andM(Φ) is undefined.
We believe that the computational aspects of any physical system can be described by FFOT machine,
however there may well exist FFOT machines that do not have any physical realisation.
Example 1.1 Let V = {R, f ,c} where R is a unary relation, f a unary function, and c a constant. A
simple example of a FFOT machine isM= (T,I,O) where:
• T= {∀x(R(x)↔ R( f (x)))},
• I= {{R(c)},{¬R(c)}},
• O= {R( f (c)),¬R( f ( f (c)))}.
We then have M({R(c)}) = {R( f (c))} as in any model of T, if R(c) is true then R( f (c)) must also be
true, so T∪{R(c)} |= {R( f (c))}. WhereasM({¬R(c)}) = {¬R( f ( f (c)))} as given ¬R(c) by T we then
have ¬R( f (c)) is true and so ¬R( f ( f (c))) is true, hence T∪{¬R(c)} |= {¬R( f ( f (c)))}.
As many examples of computational systems write their inputs and outputs as words, we naturally require
a standard manner in which to write words as first-order sentences. We can do this by assigning the values
of a well-behaved sequence of ground terms [8] to the symbols in the word.
Definition 1.2 We call a sequence of distinct ground terms {χi}i∈N a simple sequence if every sequent
is of the form χi = γ(σ
i(δ )) where δ is a ground term, and γ(y) and σ(y) are terms with a single free
variable y.
Let X = (χi)i∈N be a simple sequence. For a set of constants Σ with b 6∈ Σ, the X -word set corre-
sponding to w= w0w1 · · ·wn ∈ Σ∗ is:
ΦwX =
n⋃
i=0
{χi = wi}∪{χn+1 = b}.
We denote the set of X -word sets from an alphabet Σ by Σˆ∗X = {ΦwX | w ∈ Σ∗}.
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So a finite word set ΦwX maps each term χi to the ith symbol in w, the symbol b is then intended to
represent the “blank” symbol, hence χn+1 = b implies that this is the end of the word. This is necessary
as without the blank assignment it would be the case that for any prefix word v of w we would have
ΦwX |= ΦvX , which would clearly interfere with our notion of computation. Note that if χi = γ(σ i(δ )) then
by adding the sentence ∀y((γ(y) = b)→ (γ(σ(y)) = b)) to the theory of a machine with inputs from Σˆ∗X
we can ensure that χ j = b for each j > n.
Remark 1.1 For simplicity, X -words use the equality symbol “=” in their construction. In any FFOT
machine with vocabulary Vwhich takes such inputs we will ensure that=∈V satisfies the usual equality
axioms EQ=V (Definition A.1 in the appendix) of being an equivalence relation which preserves the
functions and relations of V. As a FFOT machine’s theory is finite, its vocabulary can assumed to be as
well, meaning that the equality axioms for V can always form a finite part of the machine’s theory.
Example 1.2 Let N be a Turing machine which decides the problem A ⊆ Σ∗. For simplicity, we shall
take N’s tape to be infinite in only the rightwards direction, with a symbol L marking its leftmost tape
cell. Let N use the alphabet Λ ⊇ Σ∪{L,b}, where b indicates a blank tape cell. Let N use the set of
internal states Π with initial state s0, accepting state sa, and rejecting state sr. Let N follow the set of
rules R, each of the form:
(t,b;u,c, p) ∈ (Π\{sa,sr})×Λ×Π×Λ×{LEFT,PAUSE,RIGHT},
which is read as “if the machine is in internal state t reading b then go to state u, replace the symbol being
pointed to with c, and move p.” To avoid the situation where no rule may be applied prior to halting we
let R contain a rule beginning with (t,b) for every t ∈Π\{s1} and b ∈Λ. We can then describe N by the
FFOT machine:
TMN = (TMTN , Σˆ
∗
X,{{I(h) = sa},{I(h) = sr}}),
in the vocabulary of VN = {S,0,C, I,H,h,L}∪Λ∪Π.
Where {S,0} are the usual symbols of Peano arithmetic with S as the successor function, C is a
binary function, I,H are unary functions, and the rest of the symbols are constants. C(x,y) maps to the
constants of Σ to describe the contents of the yth tape cell at time x, whereas I(x) gives the internal state
at time x by mapping to the constants of Π, and H(x) maps to the head position at time x. The halting
time is represented by the constant symbol h, its value depends on the input. We encode the input words
from Σ∗ via the simple sequence X = {C(0,(Si+1(0))}i∈N. The theory of TMN is:
TMTN =


(H(0) = 1)∧ (C(0,0) = L)∧ (I(0) = s0),
∀y(C(0,y) = b)→ (C(0,S(y)) = b),
∀y(¬(H(x) = y)→ (C(S(x),y) =C(x,y)))

∪EQ=VN ∪PSA∪ Rˆ∪HT(sa,sr).
Where PSA denotes the set of first-order Peano axioms (Definition A.2 in the appendix). This together
with the equality axioms EQ=
VN
ensures that any model A of TMTN ∪ΦwX is an expansion of either the
usual structure of the natural numbers 〈N;=,S,0〉 or a structure with an initial segment that is isomorphic
to 〈N;=,S,0〉 [12]. The first two sentences in TMTN together with ΦwX give A the initial configuration
of N on input w. The evolution of the machine in A is then given by the third sentence and Rˆ where:
Rˆ=
⋃
(t,b;u,c,p)∈R
{∀x(µ(t,b)(x,H(x))→ (µ(u,c)(S(x),H(x))∧pi(p)(H(x),H(S(x)))))} .
Each sentence of Rˆ implements a rule of R via the term:
µ(s,a)(z1,z2)≡ ((I(z1) = s)∧ (C(z1,z2) = a)),
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which indicates that at time z1 the internal state is s, and the cell z2 contains an a, as well as the term:
pi(p)(z1,z2)≡


z2 = S(z1) if p= RIGHT,
z2 = z1 if p= PAUSE,
S(z2) = z1 if p= LEFT,
which indicates how tape cell z1 relates to tape cell z2. The remaining sentences of TMTN are:
HT(sa,sr) =
{ ∀x((I(S(x)) = sa)∧¬(I(x) = sa))→ (h= S(x)), ∀x((I(x) = sa)→ (I(S(x)) = sa)),
∀x((I(S(x)) = sr)∧¬(I(x) = sr))→ (h= S(x)), ∀x((I(x) = sr)→ (I(S(x)) = sr))
}
which ensure that h is the first time step of A at which the machine is at either the accepting state or the
rejecting state, and afterwards A remains in that state.
By assumption, N eventually accepts or rejects any input w, which means that either sa or sr must
be reached at some finite time step, hence h is necessarily located in the initial segment of A. Therefore
the value of I(h) is entirely determined prior to h, and anything that occurs after h or at non-standard
time steps cannot affect this output without leading to an inconsistent model. Consequently we have that
TMN(Φ
w
X ) = {I(h) = sa} iff N accepts w ∈ Σ∗.
Example 1.3 As noted in the introduction, in [2] Blakey described a classical physical device capable
of factorising integers in polynomially bounded space and time. His device consists of a screen with a
pair of slits of distance 1 apart with a light source placed halfway between the two slits. It also includes a
detector that runs perpendicular to the screen from one of the slits which is able detect sufficiently strong
instances of radiation at integer distances from the screen. To factorise the integer n ∈ N one makes the
light source emit radiation of wavelength 1
2
√
n
, the two slits then diffract the light and cause interference
pattern on the detector. Blakey showed that if maximal constructive interference is detected at a distance
h from the screen then
√
n(
√
h2+1+h) must be a factor of n.
Blakey’s double slit factorisation system can be described by an electromagnetic wave function E :
R4→R3 whose propagation depends on the electromagnetic wave equations and the constraints detailed
above. Such a description can then be implemented by a FFOT machineM which satisfies the first-order
axioms of a dense ordered field [14] (Definition A.3 in the appendix). These axioms are modelled by
the usual structure of the reals 〈R;=,<,6,+,×,0,1〉, so E can be described via quaternary functions
E1,E2,E3. It is then possible to define the partial derivatives of these functions. Typically the partial
derivative of Ei in the 1st dimension is defined to be:
∂1Ei(x,y,z, t) = lim
δ→0
|(Ei(x+δ ,y,z, t)−Ei(x,y,z, t)|
δ
.
Hence we can define this in the vocabulary of the machine as a quaternary function ∂1Ei which satisfies:
∀x∀y∀z∀t∀ε∃δ (((0< ε)∧ (0< δ ))→ ((|((Ei(x+δ ,y,z, t)−Ei(x,y,z, t))− (∂1Ei(x,y,z, t)×δ ))| 6 ε)).
Therefore the electromagnetic wave equations can then be implemented inM by explicitly writing them
out in the vocabulary of M in the theory of M. The screen and slits can be implemented as boundary
conditions whereas the location of the light source l may be specified by an input of the form ΦwY for
w ∈ {0,1}∗ and Y = {B(Dk(n))}k∈N . Where B and D are unary functions such that D(y) = y2 , and:
B(y) =


0 if y ∈ ⋃∞m=1[2m,2m+1),
1 if y ∈ ⋃∞m=1[2m+1,2m),
b if y ∈ [0,1).
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It is then the case that B(Dk(y)) gives the kth binary digit of n (reading from right to left). We can
then define l within the theory as satisfying (l× l× (1+1+1+1)×n) = 1. The output can be extracted
via a similar mechanism.
There is a potential problem though, the dense ordered field axioms do not include the second-order
least upper-bound axiom, which means that they are also satisfied by the usual structure of the rationals
〈Q;=,<,6,+,×,0,1〉, as well as various non-standard models. However, as in Example 1.2 these other
possible models will still give the correct output. Blakey’s device was designed to output correctly even
if there is a degree of error, so a rational model is not a problem, whereas any non-standard elements
should be unable to interact with the rest of the model.
Quantum computers and fluid-based computers may also be described by FFOTmachines, details of how
this can be done may be found in [16].
Definition 1.3 Let A ⊆ Σ∗ be a word problem. We say that a FFOT machine M = (T,I,O) in the
vocabulary of V is able to compute A if there exists a simple sequence X such that Σˆ∗X ⊆ I, and for two
distinct finite output sets Θ,Ψ ∈O we have that for every w ∈ Σ∗:
(w ∈ A ⇐⇒ M(ΦwX ) = Θ) and (w 6∈ A ⇐⇒ M(ΦwX) = Ψ).
So a FFOT machine is able to compute a word function if there exists a way in which we can configure
each input word into the machine, such that the output of the function can clearly determined from the
machine. Note that a problem can only be computed by a FFOT machine if every possible input word
can be encoded into the machine, as we should not be able to just ignore troublesome inputs.
Theorem 1.1 A word problem A ⊆ Σ∗ is computable by a Turing machine if and only if there exists a
finite first-order theory machine which is able to compute A.
Proof: (⇒) By Example 1.2 if A⊆ Σ∗ is computed by a Turing machine N then the FFOT machine TMN
is able to compute A via the simple sequence X and outputs {I(h) = sa} and {I(h) = sr}.
(⇐) This follows from the fact that for any FFOT machine M= (T,I,O) and any input w encoded
as ΦwX we must have T∪ΦwX |= Θ for some Θ ∈O. As first order logic is complete there must therefore
exist a finite proof of each element of Θ from T∪ΦwX , which can be found by enumerating all proofs
from T∪ΦwX and halting when the entirety of an element of O is found. (A full proof of this direction
can be found in [16].) 
The (generally accepted) Church-Turing thesis [5, 6] states that “Every effectively calculable function is
computable by a Turing machine”. The Church-Turing thesis was originally only meant to assert that
anything a person is able to calculate is computable by a Turing machine, however it has been suggested
[6] that it also applies to what we may effectively calculate via a physical system. Consequently if the
Church-Turing thesis does apply to physical computation then by the above result the computational
capabilities of any usable physical system must be describable by a FFOT machine.
2 FFOT machine complexity
Though a Turing machine is typically defined as being unbounded in time and space, a halting compu-
tation on a Turing machine is usually understood to be finite in time and space. Hence we may describe
a Turing machine computation in time t and space s via a structure with a domain of size Max(t,s).
Similarly we may view a kinematic system as a continuously infinite structure, but if when implement-
ing it we require only bounded precision (as in Example 1.3), along with bounded space and time, then
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a computation on it may be described by a finite approximating structure. For example a computation
of precision ε , taking time t and within a space of diameter r, may be described via a structure of size
Max(t, rε ). We therefore argue that if a FFOT machine on input Φ is satisfied by a finite structure of size
n, then the amount of computational resources required to carry out a computation on input Φ is of order
at most n.
Definition 2.1 Let A ⊆ Σ∗ be a word problem, and q : N→ N be a strictly increasing function. We say
that a FFOT machineM= (T,I,O) is able to compute A with q resources ifM is able to compute A via
some simple sequence X and Σˆ∗X ⊆ I, such that for every w ∈ Σ∗ there exists a structure A where:
T∪ΦwX |= A, and |dom(A)|6 q(|w|),
where dom(A) denotes the domain of A.
So if a physical system can be described by a FFOT machine which is able to compute a problem A with
q resources then we believe that such a system requires at most order q resources to decide A.
Example 2.1 Despite describing a Turing machine, our FFOT machine in Example 1.2 cannot com-
pute any problem with a finite amount of resources. This is because every structure which satisfies the
machine’s theory is an expansion of N and therefore infinite.
However it is possible to describe a Turing machine with a FFOT machine that has bounded models
of arbitrary finite size, we just need to replace PSA in the theory of TMN with PSA f (Definition A.4 in
the appendix). PSA f defines a number space similar to N that has a specified greatest number e, with
S(e) = e. Models of PSA f include structures with domain {0,1, . . . ,n−1,n} for any n ∈N. We can then
describe a Turing machine N as in Example 1.2 by the FFOT machine:
TM′N = (TMT
′
N , Σˆ
∗
X,{{I(h) = sa},{I(h) = sr}}),
in the vocabulary of VN ∪{e}, where TMT′N = (TMTN \PSA)∪PSA f , and VN and TMTN are as they
are in Example 1.2. If a computation of N on input w takes n time steps before halting then any model
B of TMT′N ∪ΦwX must have at least n elements. As by the rules in Rˆ the values of either C(x,y), I(x)
or H(x) must change moving from time x to time S(x) (if they did not change then N would be stuck in
a never halting loop), leading to a contradiction if S(x) = x.
Conversely for large enough n we may have |dom(B)| = n+ 1 with dom(B) = {0,1, . . . ,n} and
n = h = e. As after time n the state of N is either sa or sr, in which case no rule of Rˆ may be applied
and there is no need for the values of any of C(x,y), I(x) or H(x) to differ from C(S(x),y), I(S(x)) or
H(S(x)).
Consequently if a problem A ⊆ Σ∗ is computable by a polynomial time Turing machine with time
function p : N→ N, then A is computable by a FFOT machine with p resources.
Unlike exponential growth, a polynomial resource growth is relatively manageable. We therefore believe
that a FFOT machine can feasibly decide a problem if and only it is able to decide the problem with
polynomially resources. This fits with the usual notions of what is feasibly computable with other well
known models of computation.
Example 2.2 As in Example 2.1 we can convert the FFOT machine describing Blakey’s factorisation
system in Example 1.3 into a FFOT machine with finite models. This is done by modifying the dense
ordered field axioms to make them have finite models which serve as approximations to R and Q (These
axioms, DOFf , are given by Definition A.5 in the appendix).
46 An Atemporal Model of Physical Complexity
We can then describe Blakey’s factorisation system in an otherwise identical manner to before. Par-
tial derivatives can be defined as approximations to there true value using the same definition given in
Example 1.3. Since Blakey’s factorisation system was designed to output even with a degree of error,
the outputs will also be the same, provided that each model of the system is sufficiently precise. To
ensure that we have enough precision we can define within the theory the error of the model 1
r
(Detailed
in Definition A.5 in the appendix) to be sufficiently small in relation to the input. For example we may
have (1
r
×n×n×n)6 1, ensuring that 1
r
6 1
n3
.
Clearly inputting n should, in general, give a different output to inputting n+1. Hence there must be
a clear separation between 1
2
√
n
and 1
2
√
n+1
, which means that in order to implement the device the error
1
r
must be less than | 1
2
√
n+1
− 1
2
√
n
|. This error shrinks at an inverse polynomial rate with respect to n, and
at an inverse exponential rate with respect to the length of n’s binary expansion. The axioms of DOFf
imply that, between its greatest and least element, the structure is closed under addition, meaning that
there are at least r elements between 0 and 1 alone. Therefore, as r grows exponentially with the size of
the input, so must the minimal model size.
We therefore conclude that such a FFOT machine requires at least exponential resources to compute
the factorisation problem, agreeing with Blakey’s [2] idea that precision should be viewed as a resource.
Remark 2.1 The polynomial time non-causal circuits of Baumeler and Wolf [1], may also be described
by polynomial resource-bounded FFOT machines. However they are only able to decide problems in
UP∩ co-UP, as unlike FFOT machines, each circuit must have a unique satisfying model. Choosing to
limit FFOT machines in such a way would give us UP∩ co-UP in the above result. However doing so
would mean that a FFOTmachine would have to provide the definitive description of the physical system
it is describing, something that may well be impossible to verify.
Theorem 2.1 A problem is computable by a FFOT machine with polynomial resources if and only if it
is in NP∩ co-NP.
Proof: (⇒) Let p be a polynomial function and M= (T,I,O) be a FFOT machine in the vocabulary V
which computes A⊆ Σ∗ with p resources. So by assumption, for some simple sequence X and Θ,Ψ ∈O,
we have Σ∗X ⊆ I and for each w ∈ Σ∗ there is a finite V-structure A satisfying T∪ΦwX with |dom(A)| 6
p(|w|). Also if w ∈ A then A |= Θ and if w 6∈ A then A |= Ψ. We can non-deterministically obtain such a
structure as follows.
Let V contain m relations, k functions, and r constant symbols, also let each relation and function
have an arity at most l. We can encode each element of dom(A) as a word in {0,1}p(|w|) . Each relation
can then be encoded as a string of length O(p(|w|)l) by simply listing the codes of the related elements.
Similarly each function can be encoded by a string of length O(p(|w|)l+1) and each constant by a string
of lengthO(p(|w|)). We can therefore encode an exact description ofA by a single word ρw ∈{0,1}q(|w|) ,
where q(n) = O(m · p(n)l+ k · p(n)l+1+ r · p(n)), which is polynomial in the length of w.
In a fixed domain dom(A) a sentence of the form ∀xφ(x) is true iff the sentence ∧a∈dom(A) φ(a) is
true. Similarly ∃xψ(x) is true iff ∨b∈dom(A) ψ(b) is true. Hence to check if:
∀x1∃x2 · · ·∀xm−1∃xmθ(x1, . . . ,xm) ∈ T,
is true in A described by ρw it is sufficient to determine whether:
∧
a1∈dom(A)
∨
a2∈dom(A)
· · ·
∧
am−1∈dom(A)
∨
am∈dom(A)
θ(a1, . . . ,am),
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is true in A. This can be achieved by checking whether θ(a1, . . . ,am) is true in at most |dom(A)|m
assignments.
There is a fixed number of sentences in T and the quantifier depth of each one is fixed, hence the time
taken to test whether A |= T grows polynomially with |w|. As the number of sentences in ΦwX is equal to
|w| and each sentence in ΦwX is a quantifier-free sentence whose length grows linearly with |w|, the time
to determine whether A models ΦwX also takes time polynomial in |w|.
We can therefore construct a non-deterministic Turing machine M1, that given any input w ∈ Σ∗,
tries to non-deterministically generate a description ρw of some structure A modelling T∪ΦwX. After
generating ρw the machine checks in polynomially many steps whether each sentence of T∪ΦwX is true
in A. Finally M1 determines whether A |= Θ. As Θ is a fixed finite set of sentences, like T, this decision
process can be carried out in time polynomial in |w|. If A does model Θ then M1 accepts w. If any
sentence in T∪ΦwX∪Θ is false in A then M1 halts. Thus if for all possible ρw we have that Θ is false in
any structure which models T∪ΦwX thenM1 rejects w. By assumption for any w∈ Σ∗, if A |=T∪ΦwX then
A |= Θ iff w ∈ A. Therefore M1 accepts w if and only if w ∈ A, and asM1 computes in non-deterministic
polynomial time we have that A ∈ NP.
Conversely to see that A ∈ co-NP we can construct a non-deterministic polynomial time Turing
machine M2 which acts the same as M1, except it checks whether A models Ψ rather than Θ. By the
same reasoning as above M2 accepts w ∈ Σ∗ iff w ∈ Σ∗ \A, therefore Σ∗ \A ∈ NP and A ∈ co-NP. Thus
by combining this with the above result we have A ∈ NP∩ co-NP.
(⇐) If B ∈ NP∩ co-NP then B ∈ NP and Σ∗ \B ∈ NP, hence there must exist two non-deterministic
polynomial time Turing machines N1,N2 that respectively decide B and Σ
∗\B. Without loss of generality,
as in Example 1.2 we can take N1 and N2’s tapes to be infinite in only the rightwards direction. To avoid
confusion we can also let N1 and N2 have disjoint sets of internal states. We can then construct a FFOT
machine which can implement the rules from either N1 or N2, to decide B as follows.
For i ∈ {1,2} let Turing machine Ni use the alphabet Λi ⊇ Σ∪{L,b}, internal states Πi and have
initial state s0i and accepting state sai . Let Ni have non-deterministic rule set Ri, and for each (t,b) ∈
(Πi×Λi) let R(t,b)i denote the set of rules of Ri prefixed by (t,b). If Ni is in state t reading b then any
one of the rules in R
(t,b)
i may be applied. As in Example 1.2 let V
Ni be the vocabulary used in describing
a Turing machine with the above alphabet and state set.
In the vocabulary of VN1 ∪VN2 ∪{e} let TM′N1,N2 = (TMT′N1,N2 , Σˆ∗X,{{I(h) = sa1},{I(h) = sa2}}),
be a FFOT machine with theory:
TMT′N1,N2 =


(H(0) = 1)∧ (C(0,0) = L),
(I(0) = s01)∨ (I(0) = s02),
∀y(C(0,y) = b)→ (C(0,S(y)) = b),
∀y(¬(H(x) = y)→ (C(S(x),y) =C(x,y))),
(I(h) = sa1)∨ (I(h) = sa2)


∪EQ=VN ∪PSA f ∪ Rˆ1∪ Rˆ2∪HT(sa1,sa2 ).
where for i ∈ {1,2} the non-deterministic rules of Ri are implemented by:
Rˆi =
⋃
(t,b)∈(Πi×Λi)

∀x

µ(t,b)(x,H(x))→ ∨
(t,b;u,c,p)∈R(t,b)i
(
µ(u,c)(S(x),H(x))∧pi(p)(H(x),H(S(x)))
)



 .
Where the terms µ and pi are as they are in Example 1.2. It is then the case that any model C of
TMT′N1,N2 ∪ΦwX describes a possible computation path of either N1 or N2. As by the second sentence
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of TMT′N1,N2 the model begins in either of the states, and afterwards the sentences of Rˆ1∪ Rˆ2 allow for
any one of the appropriate rules to be implemented at each time step of C. Two different rules cannot be
implemented simultaneously as this would lead to a contradiction.
The set HT(sa1 ,sa2 )
is as it is in Example 1.2 with sa and sr replaced by sa1 and sa2 . Crucially by the
fifth sentence of TMT′N1,N2 any model C must reach one of the two accept states. Hence the computation
in C must be an accepting computation, and if w ∈ B then C must describe a computation of N1 that ends
in state sa1 , as any computation of N2 on input w would end in the reject state. Conversely if w ∈ Σ∗ \B
then C must describe a computation of N2 that ends in state sa2 .
Regardless, this means that C |= (I(h) = sa1) iff w∈ B. We also know that any accepting computation
of N1 or N2 takes a polynomial number of time steps. Therefore by our reasoning in Example 2.1 and the
fact that PSA f ⊂ TMT′N1,N2 we know that |dom(C)|may be polynomial in |w|. Consequently TM′N1,N2 is
able to compute B in polynomial resources. 
The FFOT machine described in the above proof will only follow a computational path if that path
eventually leads to an accept state. The only way the machine could know which paths to take would
be if potential future states are somehow able to influence the present states. The machine therefore acts
in a non-causal and somewhat atemporal manner, whilst still being clearly bounded in its computational
capabilities.
If P 6= NP∩ co-NP then our result implies that atemporal/non-causal physical computation is more
powerful then classical sequential computation. The problems with known quantum polynomial time
algorithms that are believed to lie in BQP \P can all be phrased as a hidden subgroup problem [13],
which also lies in NP∩ co-NP. Therefore our result adds further evidence to the idea that source of the
quantum computational speed-up lies in quantum computers being able to act in an atemporal/non-causal
manner.
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A Appendix
Definition A.1 In a vocabulary V for each m-ary relation R ∈ V and n-ary function f ∈V let:
EQ=R ≡ ∀x1 . . .∀xm∀y1 . . .∀ym
m∧
i=1
(xi = yi)→ (R(x1, . . . ,xm)↔ R(y1, . . . ,ym)),
EQ=f ≡ ∀x1 . . .∀xn∀y1 . . .∀yn
n∧
i=1
(xi = yi)→ ( f (x1, . . . ,xn) = f (y1, . . . ,yn)).
The equality axioms [8] for the binary relation =∈ V are then:
EQ=V = {EQ=V | V ∈ V}∪


∀x(x= x),
∀x∀y(x= y)→ (y= x),
∀x∀y∀z((x= y)∧ (y= z))→ (x= z)

 .
Definition A.2 Within the vocabulary of VS = {=,S,0} where S is a unary function, and 0 is a constant
symbol, the first-order Peano successor axioms are:
PSA=


∀x¬(S(x) = 0),
∀x∀y((S(x) = S(y))→ (x= y)),
∀x¬(S(x) = x)

 .
Any model of EQ=
VS
∪PSA is either the usual structure of the natural numbers 〈N;=,S,0〉 or a structure
with an initial segment that is isomorphic to 〈N;=,S,0〉 [12].
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Definition A.3 Within the vocabulary VQ = {=,<,6,+,×,0,1} the dense ordered field axioms are:
DOF =


∀x((x+0) = x)∧ ((x×0) = 0), (0< 1),
∀x∀y∀z(((x+ y)+ z) = (x+(y+ z))), ∀x∀y((x+ y) = (y+ x)),
∀x∀y∀z(((x× y)× z) = (x× (y× z))), ∀x∀y((x× y) = (y× x)),
∀x∀y∀z(((x+ y)× z) = ((x× z)+ (y× z))), ∀x∃y((x+ y) = 0),
∀x∀y(06 y)→ (x6 (x+ y)), ∀x(¬(x= 0)→∃y((x× y) = 1)),
∀x∀y∀z((x < y)∧ (y< z))→ (x< z), ∀x¬(x< x),
∀x∀y∀z(x6 y)→ ((x+ z)6 (y+ z)), ∀x∀y(x6 y)↔ ((x < y)∨ (x= y)),
∀x∀y∀z((0< z)∧ (x6 y))→ ((x× z)6 (y× z)), ∀x∀y(x< y)∨ (x= y)∨ (y< x)


.
Every model R of EQ=
VQ
∪DOF contains a subset G which can be embedded into the usual structure
of the real numbers 〈R;=,<,6,+,×,0,1〉. There also exists a subset of G which is isomorphic to the
usual structure of the rational numbers 〈Q;=,<,6,+,×,0,1〉 [14]. Hence G is closed under +,× and
the elements ofQ. Therefore, the output of a machine including DOF can be independent of what occurs
at any non-standard elements outside of R.
Definition A.4 Within the vocabulary of VSf = V
S∪{e} where e is a constant symbol, the finite Peano
successor axioms are:
PSA f =


∀x¬(S(x) = 0),
∀x∀y((S(x) = S(y))→ ((x= y)∨ (S(x) = e))),
∀x((S(x) = x)↔ (x= e))

 .
EQ=
VSf
∪PSA f is modelled by any finite structure of the form 〈{0,1, . . . ,n};=,S,0,e〉 where Si(0) = i
and n = e. Indeed any model N of EQ=
VSf
∪PSA can be converted into a model of EQ=
VSf
∪PSA f by
replacing the subset of N that is isomorphic to 〈N;=,S,0〉 with 〈{0,1, . . . ,n};=,S,0,e〉. Alternatively,
by disjointly combining the domain of N with the set {. . . ,−2,−1,e} where S−i(i) = e, we also obtain
a model of EQ=
VSf
∪PSA f , but with an initial segment that is isomorphic to 〈N;=,S,0〉.
In a similar manner we can finitely approximate R via a structure with greatest and least elements
given by e and -e, as well as error and precision given by 1
r
and r respectively. To enable an approximate
version of multiplication we introduce the approximate equality relation “≈”, which holds if two numbers
are within a distance of 1
r
from one another.
Definition A.5 Within the vocabulary V
Q
f ∪{≈,e, -e,r, 1r } where ≈ is a binary relation and e, -e,r, 1r are
constants let:
DOF ′ =


(06 1
r
)∧ ((r× 1
r
) = 1)∧ ((r× r) = e)∧ ((-e+ e) = 0)∧ ((-r+ r) = 0),
∀x∀y(x≈ y)↔ ((x6 (y+ 1
r
))∧ (y6 (x+ 1
r
))),
∀x(06 x)→ ((e+ x) = e),
∀x(16 x)→ ((e× x) = e),
∀x((x6 e)∧ (-e6 x)),
∀x∀y∀z((-e< (x+ y),(y+ z)< e)→ (((x+ y)+ z) = (x+(y+ z))),
∀x∀y∀z(-e< (x× y),(y× z) < e)→ (((x× y)× z)≈ (x× (y× z))),
∀x∀y∀z(-e< (x+ y),(x× z),(y× z) < e)→ (((x+ y)× z)≈ ((x× z)+ (y× z)))


.
Where a6 b,c6 d is shorthand for (a6 b)∧ (b6 d)∧ (a6 c)∧ (c6 d). The finite dense ordered field
axioms are then:
DOFf = DOF
′∪DOF \


∀x∀y∀z(((x+ y)+ z) = (x+(y+ z))),
∀x∀y∀z(((x× y)× z) = (x× (y× z))),
∀x∀y∀z(((x+ y)× z) = ((x× z)+ (y× z)))

 .
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EQ=
VSf
∪DOFf is modelled by any finite structure of the form 〈{ am | a∈ {−m3, . . . ,m3}};=,<,6,S,+,×,
0,1,e, -e,r, 1
r
〉 where <,6,0,1 are as they usually are in Q. Also e = m3
m
, -e = −m
3
m
, r = m
2
m
, and 1
r
= 1
m
.
Addition is as usual with a
m
+ b
m
= m
3
m
if a+b>m3 and a
m
+ b
m
=−e if a+b6m3. Whereas multiplication
is such that a
m
× b
m
is approximately equal to whichever element in the domain is nearest to ab
m2
.
EQ=
VSf
∪DOFf may also be modelled by structures with subsets that are isomorphic to the reals and
the rationals. This is due to the fact that it is possible that r could be transfinite and 1
r
could be an
infinitesimal, in which case addition and multiplication should act as usual.
